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European Minority Rights Law: Unilateral 
Legislation in Favour of Kin-Minorities 
A number of countries in Europe have adopted legislation or policies that pertain 
to kin-minorities living outside the territory of the state. While a number of the 
new democracies in Eastern Europe after 1989 incorporated statements in their 
constitutions indicating concerns for nationals living outside the mother stat e1,  
ten European countries have taken expl icit unilateral action to adopt public law 
legislation or regulations in favour of kin -minorities outside the mother state 2.  
Not all of these actions have extraterritorial reach, nor do all appropriate 
specific funds. Some address the financial side of mi nority life. Beneficiaries are 
mostly individuals, whereas some pieces of legislation support activities and/or 
institutions. Most authorize an entity in the mother state to be in charge of 
implementing the measures, and most provision for special status o f members of 
minorities in both the home state and the mother state. However, international 
law does not sanction unilateral legislation as a means to protect minorities. Only 
in the event that no other measure or mechanism can secure the protection, does 
international law reluctantly sanction legal unilateralism. And in such cases, both 
parties to the issue must agree and consent. This Working Paper examines ten 
unilateral measures in force in Europe and puts them in the perspective of 
international law.   
Tove H. Malloy, July 2012 
ECMI Working Paper #60 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The international approach to unilateral 
legislation with extraterritorial reach is quite 
clear. General principles of customary 
international law entrust the state where national 
minorities reside with the task of securing the 
rights of all persons within its jurisdiction. 
Preferential treatment of national minorities by 
their kin-state is considered the exception unless 
it is established through bilateral treaties, or as a 
minimum agreed among the parties involved. 
The League of Nations system was the first 
European multilateral attempt to provide 
protection for minorities outside the mother state 
through bilateral treaties. After the collapse of 
the League of Nations system and the transfer of 
international protection of minorities to the 
United Nations system, bilateralism was not 
specifically promoted but nonetheless carried 
over as the main approach to kin-minority 
protection. This approach came under pressure 
after 1989 and the collapse of Communism 
when a number of countries adopted unilateral 
laws on kin-state minorities and compatriots 
living abroad. The bilateral approach received 
renewed attention, therefore, as part of the 
multilateral approach promoted by the 
international community after 1989. 
 
Bilateral treaties have the advantage that 
they can procure specific commitments on 
sensitive issues, while multilateral agreements 
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can only provide for an indirect approach. 
Furthermore, they allow for the specific 
characteristics and needs of each national 
minority as well as of the peculiar historical, 
political and social context to be taken into 
direct consideration.
3
 Bilateral treaties usually 
contain mutual commitments to respect 
international norms and principles regarding 
national minorities. They often incorporate 
references to soft law provisions, such as the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation no. 1201 (1993) and the CSCE 
Copenhagen Document (1990), and, by so doing  
give them binding effect in their mutual 
relations.   
 
In 1993, bilateralism received a strong 
impetus when the EU adopted the so-called 
Balladur initiative, a French proposal for a Pact 
on Stability in Europe.
4
 The Pact aimed at 
achieving stability through the promotion of 
good neighbourly relations in Eastern Europe, 
including questions related to frontiers and 
minorities, as well as regional co-operation and 
the strengthening of democratic institutions 
through co-operation arrangements.
5
 As part of 
its first phase, the Pact on Stability was handed 
over to the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and eventually 
adopted by 52 member states in 1995. The 
OSCE agreement was not identical with the 
Balladur plan, but contained the same aims 
together with principles and commitments 
earlier agreed to in the CSCE context. It 
included a list of bilateral treaties, all of which 
were drawn up outside of the Stability Pact with 
the exception of the one between Slovakia and 
Hungary,
6
 as well as a package of co-operative 
measures financed by the EU.
7
 It is estimated 
that around 100 treaties and agreements were 
concluded as a result of the Pact. In 2008, the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM) followed up with a set of 
Recommendations on inter-state relations in 
connection with protection of national 
minorities.
8
 The notion of bilateralism as a tool 
in minority protection was, therefore, clear from 
1995 onwards.  
 
 
II. MULTILATERALISM 
At the multilateral level, specific international 
agreements have assigned the role of supervision 
of states‟ obligations to the international 
community. In Europe, the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) is the primary legal 
document establishing this rule. Article 18 of 
that Convention provides for bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to be concluded with 
other states, in particular neighbouring states in 
order to ensure the protection of persons 
belonging to national minorities. The United 
Nations (UN) also promotes the stipulation of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties.
9
 In the specific 
case of national minorities, the OSCE HCNM 
set of recommendations on bilateralism, the so-
called Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations, on 
National Minorities in Inter-State Relations 
mirror the obligations that states have under 
international law. Thus, the Bolzano/Bozen 
Recommendations hold that:  
 
“States should refrain from taking 
unilateral steps, including extending 
benefits to foreigners on the basis of 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious or 
historical ties that have the intention or 
effect of undermining the principles of 
territorial integrity. States should not 
provide direct or indirect support for 
similar initiatives undertaken by non-
State actors.
10” 
 
While the Recommendations do recognize 
that a state may have an interest even a 
constitutionally declared responsibility to 
support persons belonging to national minorities 
residing in other states based on ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic, religious, historical or any other ties, 
this does not imply, in any way, a right under 
international law to exercise jurisdiction over 
these persons on the territory of another state 
without the consent of that state. Unilateral 
legislation with extraterritorial reach is therefore 
only legitimate if it is agreed with by the legal 
authority of the territory in the external territory 
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or with a legal authority which covers both 
territories and through which another mode of 
protection could not be found.   
 
III. LEGAL UNILATERALISM 
Legal unilateralism is to be distinguished from 
political unilateralism. The latter is mostly 
known from the individual acts of states, often 
military acts, such as the United States‟ invasion 
of Grenada in 1983 or the bombing of Libya in 
1986. This type of actions does not find any 
sanction in international law, and little if any in 
international relations. It is for this reason that 
unilateralism has a strong pejorative 
connotation.
11
 Legal unilateralism is not 
sanctioned either by international law, but has 
become increasingly an issue, especially in the 
areas of international aviation,
12
 international 
trade,
13
 international fishing,
14
 environmental 
protection,
15
 and as will be discussed in this 
paper, in minority protection.  
 
Legal unilateralism may be defined as 
expression of the will of one subject of law 
endowed with legal personality aimed at 
opposing either a legal order, or exercising 
sovereign rights, or creating new legal 
commitments.
16
 As such, unilateral action can be 
tailored to benefit national economic interests 
over foreign ones, or putting national interests 
before that of the collective interests. While 
withdrawing from or not signing up to a legal 
framework may be seen as unilateralism, a more 
controversial type of legal unilateralism is the 
imposition by one community of its values on 
another community without the consent to or 
acquiescence to these values. On this notion, 
legal unilateralism is „intrinsically linked to 
sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction.‟17 
Legal unilateralism becomes controversial 
because imposing values on others can cause 
conflict or tension between states. Legal 
unilateralism should not be confused with the 
„responsibility to protect‟ or R2P adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 2005. R2P is an 
emerging norm, or set of principles, based on the 
idea that sovereignty is not a right, but a 
responsibility. R2P focuses on matters that are 
relevant to minority protection, namely 
preventing genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. But it is clearly 
a norm, not a law, and it requires multilateral 
action through the UN Security Council and the 
General Assembly.
18
 
 
Legal unilateralism is furthermore 
controversial seen from the perspective of 
international norms on the general obligation of 
co-operation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, as enshrined in Article 1 of the UN 
Charter.
19
 Accordingly, states must engage in 
dialogue to find a solution to disputes and no 
state must adopt unilateral measures before first 
exhausting means of international negotiation. 
Nevertheless, legal unilateralism has become a 
stable part of international law, especially in 
matters of trade. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO), through the WTO Appellate Body‟s 
interpretation of WTO legal provisions, plays a 
key role in this regard. The WTO does not 
forbid unilateral regulatory action but it does 
press states to justify their actions substantively 
and procedurally or face potential trade 
sanctions. For example, WTO rules likely permit 
unilateral regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, especially when a country has 
engaged in multilateral processes in good faith 
and these processes have stalemated, but such 
regulation must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner and meet procedural 
safeguards of transparency and due process.
20
 
International law has a critical but delicate role 
to play in disciplining unilateral action. 
Therefore, unilateral action is not a one-step 
dance.  
 
Some argue that unilateral action is 
better viewed as part of a dynamic process of 
action and reaction, reassessment and response, 
in which international law plays an uneasy role 
as both a check and a potential consolidator.
21
 
According to this view, „international law needs 
to discipline (or better stated, provide guidelines 
for) unilateral action, as part of this dynamic 
process.‟22 This requires some balancing act to 
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avoid on the one hand discriminatory and 
opportunistic policies, and on the other, to avoid 
impeding needed action. Unilateral action‟s 
impact ultimately depends on whether it is 
persuasive in shaping norms of behaviour. 
Perceptions of legitimacy determine 
effectiveness, and if a rule or norm advanced 
unilaterally is deemed illegitimate, it will spur 
resistance, including challenges under 
international law, undermining its effectiveness. 
Such resistance can spur re-articulations of legal 
norms and rules as part of a recursive process. In 
contrast, where unilateral action contributes to 
the forging of a new consensus that results in the 
adoption and application of common law norms, 
it can create a transnational legal order, either in 
the form of international law or more informal 
institutional settlement. In other words, in this 
view, legal unilateralism can lead to diverse 
outcomes both in terms of regression and 
opportunity. 
 
The key is, however, whether a state has 
consented to multilateral regimes prior to 
committing to unilateral action. If a state has 
consented to a multilateral regime and then 
subsequently adopts unilateral laws that mirror 
the provisions of the regime, then the state has 
not sought to exhaust all options through co-
operation. In the case of minority protection in 
Europe, this would mean that states which have 
signed and ratified the Council of Europe‟s 
FCNM would be required to take the matter up 
with the Council of Europe first and second with 
the State in which the legislation is to take 
effect.   
IV. EUROPEAN 
UNILATERALISM 
Legal unilateralism in the area of minority 
protection in Europe is not new. It was largely 
the reason why the League of Nations collapsed 
when States party to the bilateral Minority 
Treaties began to „defect‟ and declare that they 
no longer honoured the requirements enshrined 
in the treaties.
23
 It should be noted that 
throughout the interwar years, political 
unilateralism was the policy of the Weimar 
Republic.
24
 After World War II and during the 
Cold War, legal unilateralism was not prevalent. 
One law without extraterritorial reach was 
adopted in 1979 (see below). The proliferation 
of legal unilateralism began after the adoption of 
the FCNM in 1995. In this section, unilateral 
actions will be discussed and put in the 
perspective of political motivations. While this 
is not an exhaustive analysis of the political 
situations surrounding the unilateral actions, it is 
deemed helpful to outline, however briefly, the 
political motivations, if any.  
AUSTRIA 
The Austrian Federal Law of 25 January 1979 
provides for the equation of South Tyroleans 
with Austrian citizens in certain administrative 
areas.
25
 The law applies to persons of German or 
Ladin language affiliation who were born in the 
province Bolzano having declared themselves 
being part of the German or Ladin language 
group at the latest census in the province 
Bolzano and who do not have Austrian 
citizenship. It also applies to persons who were 
not born in the province Bolzano but declared 
themselves as part of the German or Ladin 
language group at a census in the province 
Bolzano and have or had at least one parent of 
German or Ladin mother tongue. The law 
provides for certain special rights in the 
educational sector, especially within higher 
education. The reach of the law is not extra-
territorial in so far that the beneficiaries can only 
enjoy the special rights while in Austria.  
 
The political motivation for the Austrian 
Law should most likely be seen in the light of 
the autonomy settlement for the region 
Trentino/Alto Adige (Trent/South Tyrol) that 
had been agreed in 1946 through the Gruber-De 
Gaspari Agreement but which did not see 
implementation in earnest until after 1972 with 
the adoption of the New Autonomy Statute. The 
Autonomy Statute had the main aim to protect 
the Austro-German culture and language in the 
region. However, at the time, the Province of 
Bolzano (one of the two provinces in the 
arrangement) was rather rural and not 
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prosperous. It did not have a university. Young 
members of the German-speaking minority were 
left with no choice but to enrol in an Italian 
university or move to Austria or Germany to 
enrol in a university. Moreover, at the time there 
was no international treaty protecting the 
linguistic and cultural rights of minorities. The 
FCNM was only adopted in 1995 and came into 
force in 1998. The Austrian law was, therefore, 
seen as a necessary step to protect and promote 
the right to the Austro-German culture in South 
Tyrol. 
ITALY 
An Italian law No. 19 of 9 January 1991 
provides for the development of economic 
activities and international cooperation of the 
Region Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the province of 
Belluno and the neighbouring areas.
26
 The law 
appropriated 12 billion Lire for the period 1991-
1993 for activities in favour of the Italian 
minority in Yugoslavia, to be organized in co-
operation with the Region Friuli Venezia-Giulia 
and with other institutions. By law No. 73 of 21 
March 2001, the provisions were extended for 
the period 2001-2003 in the amount of 29 
million Lire (approx. EUR 15,000).
27
 According 
to the 2001 law, the funds would be used 
through a convention to be stipulated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian Union 
and the University of Trieste, in consultation 
with the Federation of the associations of exiles 
from Istria, Fiume or Dalmatia or, at any rate, 
with the single associations. The funds were to 
be used for measures and activities in the fields 
of education, culture, information, as well as, up 
to 20% of the annual budget, in the socio-
economic field. Neither of the two laws defines 
the beneficiaries more specifically but references 
to activities and institutions indicate that it is not 
aimed at individual members of the minorities. 
The laws had extraterritorial reach as the funds 
were to be used by the Region of Friuli Venezia-
Guilia in nearby regions in the former 
Yugoslavia and later in Slovenia and Croatia.  
 
It is not clear what could have motivated the 
Italian legislation politically, except that in 1991 
neither the FCNM nor the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages had been 
adopted. The lack of international instruments 
could have motivated the Italian authorities. The 
area of Fruili-Venezia Giulia and Istria has of 
course a long history of changing borders and 
the thereto related division of communities and 
families. The area is also home to a good deal of 
cultural heritage that can be seen as influencing 
the identities of groups on either side of the 
border. Thus, the opening up of Yugoslavia and 
the sudden access to and ability to co-operate 
across formerly closed borders no doubt has 
motivated policy makers. The ability alone to 
interface and move across the border between 
Italy and Slovenia, which has long been the 
home of a small Italian minority, could be a 
driving force behind the legislation. Moreover, 
the proximity of South Tyrol whose Autonomy 
Act was becoming a good practice example 
exactly at that time. Parity in terms of 
employment in the public sector was reached in 
1992.    
SLOVENIA 
In 1996, a Slovenian Resolution on the position 
of autochthonous Slovene minorities in 
neighbouring countries and the related tasks of 
state and other institutions in the Republic of 
Slovenia was adopted.
28
 The Resolution applies 
to autochthonous Slovene minorities that live in 
the Austrian provinces of Carinthia and Styria, 
the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the 
Raba basin area of Hungary, and in areas on the 
Croatian side of the Croatian-Slovenian border, 
particularly Istria, Gorski Kotar and Medmurje. 
It provides for financial support for the activities 
of cultural, educational, sports, research and 
other institutions and organisations of civil 
society in Slovenia which co-operate with 
autochthonous minorities. These institutions are 
able to include their projects in the annual 
programmes of work of state bodies of the 
Republic of Slovenia. The method and scale of 
financial support provided by the Republic of 
Slovenia to minority organisations is not 
indicated in the Resolution but defined by 
separate statute and other legal documents. 
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While the Resolution is not a law and thus is not 
under international law oversight, any statutes or 
legal documents that might have accompanied it 
would likely have extraterritorial reach.  
 
There is no indication in the Resolution 
text that it has been agreed upon by the 
neighbouring states. Moreover, unlike the 
Austrian and Italian laws, the Slovenian 
Resolution was adopted after the FCNM had 
opened for signature but before it had come into 
force. The political motivation behind the 
Resolution could, perhaps, be found in the 
experiences of turmoil that Slovenes across the 
Balkans were having due to break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the conflict of the mid-1990s. 
Many Slovenes were living outside Slovenia in 
other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and due to 
the splitting up of Yugoslavia Slovenes were 
also immigrating to Austria.    
SLOVAKIA 
The Slovak law of 14 February 1997 on 
Expatriate Slovaks adopted by the Slovak 
National Council regulates the status of 
expatriate Slovaks as well as their rights and 
duties in the territory of the Slovak Republic.
29
 It 
also defines the process for recognizing 
expatriate Slovak status and the competencies of 
the different state administration central bodies 
regarding expatriate Slovaks. In the same 
manner as the Austrian law, the Slovak law 
provides for special rights of expatriate Slovaks 
to education in Slovakia as well as a number of 
other socio-economic advantages. The 
beneficiaries are individuals, and the law only 
applies in the territory of the Slovak Republic. 
The political motivation for the Slovak law 
seems different in that it does not have extra-
territorial reach, and it does not stipulate any 
geographic area as to the residence of the 
beneficiaries, except that they live outside the 
Slovak Republic. The relevance of the FCNM, 
which was not in force at the time, is thus less 
significant since the beneficiaries of the Slovak 
law can be seen also to include the Slovak 
diaspora. Moreover, the bilateral agreement 
signed by the Slovak Republic and Hungary two 
years earlier in 1995 in connection with the 
Stability Pact for Europe had regulated the 
situation of Slovaks in Hungary. The motivation 
must, therefore, likely be found internally in 
domestic politics.     
 
At the time of adoption of the Slovak 
law on Expatriate Slovaks, domestic politics in 
the Slovak Republic had been a bit volatile. 
Vladimir Mečiar, who came into power for the 
third time in 1994, held a strong grip on power 
in the young Slovak Republic. Mečiar had been 
in charge during the breakup of Czechoslovakia, 
which he negotiated directly with Vaclav Klaus, 
the then prime minister in the Czech part of the 
country, in 1992. Later he also became 
responsible for Slovakia‟s failed attempt to get 
its application to the European Union approved 
on the fast track together with Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. In 
1999 and 2004, now out of power, Mr. Mečiar 
ran for the office of President of the Slovak 
Republic but lost to the opponent. During his 
reign, Mr. Mečiar was seen in Europe as a 
nationalist authoritarian ruler with undemocratic 
tendencies due to his purge of the public 
administration of non-loyal civil servants, 
including many members of the Hungarian 
national minority, and he was to a large extent 
persona non grata in other European countries. 
In 1996, the same year as the Slovak law on 
Expatriate Slovaks was adopted, the Mečiar 
government undertook a vast reorganization of 
the districts of Slovakia through the “Law 
pertaining to the territorial and administrative 
reorganization of the Slovak Republic.”30 
Unlike, the law on Expatriate Slovaks, which 
empowered expatriates if they came to Slovakia, 
the redistricting legislation was seen largely as 
an attempt to de-empower the Hungarian 
minority in those areas where Hungarians 
constitute large numbers of the population. The 
Law on Expatriate Slovaks could, therefore, be 
seen as an attempt by the Mečiar government to 
boost the Slovak ethnic group domestically.  
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GREECE 
In Greece, a ministerial decree of April 1998 
provided the right for Albanians of Greek origin 
living and working in Greece to identity 
papers.
31
 The validity of the identity card is three 
years and has the purpose of legalizing the stay 
and work of the beneficiaries. The Decree is not 
extraterritorial as its jurisdiction pertains only to 
individuals in the territory of Greece, and it does 
not grant any entitlements other than the right to 
work. It is not clear that there is any political 
motivation for this Decree other than 
administrative concerns with registration of 
individuals. After the breakup of Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet bloc, a large number of economic 
refugees and immigrants from Albania and other 
formerly Communist countries including 
Bulgaria, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, 
Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia arrived 
in Greece, often illegally to seek employment. 
Of these, Albanians comprise 60-65% of the 
total number of immigrants in Greece. 
According to the 2001 census, there were 
officially 443,550 holders of Albanian 
citizenship in Greece. Greece and Albania 
signed a Friendship, Cooperation, Good 
Neighborliness and Security Agreement on 21 
March 1996,
32
 and the Decree could well be 
seen as an outcome of this since it was issued 
only two years later.  
RUSSIA 
On 5 March 1999, the Russian State Duma 
adopted a federal law on the State Policy of the 
Russian Federation in respect of compatriots 
abroad.
33
 The law is based on the premise that 
compatriots who are resident abroad are entitled 
to rely on the Russian Federation‟s support in 
exercising their civil, political, social, economic 
and cultural rights, and in preserving their 
distinctive identity. The beneficiaries of the law 
are defined as citizens of the Russian Federation 
who are resident on a permanent basis outside 
the Russian Federation, who were citizens of the 
USSR and live in states that were formerly part 
of the USSR, who have become citizens of those 
states or become stateless persons, who are 
expatriates (emigrants) from the Russian state, 
the Russian republic, the RSFSR, the USSR and 
the Russian Federation, who had the 
corresponding citizenship and have become 
citizens of a foreign state, or who have a 
residence permit in one of these states or have 
become stateless persons as well as the 
descendants of individuals belonging to the 
above-mentioned groups, with the exception of 
descendants of individuals from the titular 
nation of the foreign state.  
 
The law aims to ensure that Russian 
compatriots can freely express, preserve and 
develop their distinct identity and develop their 
spiritual and intellectual potential, that they can 
establish freely multifaceted links with the 
Russian Federation, as well as receive 
information from the Russian Federation, that 
they can establish national-cultural autonomy, 
public associations and mass media and 
participate in the activities of these institutions, 
that they can participate in the work of non-
governmental organisations at national and 
international level and develop mutually-
beneficial relations between the state of 
residence and the Russian Federation as well as 
exercise their free choice regarding one‟s place 
of residence or the right to return to the Russian 
Federation. Specifically, the law supports 
compatriots in the field of fundamental human 
rights, the economic and social field, the field of 
culture, language and education as well as the 
field of information. The law does not refer to 
appropriations for these many areas but 
provisions that funding will be allocated from 
the federal budget. Funding is to be made 
available both outside and inside the Russian 
Federation.  
 
The law has clear extraterritorial reach 
and there is no indication that the Russian 
Federation has sought approval from specific 
states in whose territory the law will have 
jurisdiction. By most accounts, the political 
motivation of the Russian law on compatriots 
abroad should be seen in the light of the large 
group of Russians living in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania and who became minorities in the 
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Baltic states after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the independence of these states. 
With the adoption of stringent citizenship 
criteria in Estonia and Latvia, many Russians 
were unable to claim citizenship let alone 
become naturalized. For these people, the only 
resort in terms of citizenship was Russia which 
issued passports upon request. Over the years, 
Latvia has loosened the criteria whereas Estonia 
retains the level of criteria. Moreover, in 1998, 
Estonia adopted for the first time a social 
integration programme which has been renewed 
several times and is now in its third period. The 
programme takes starting point in the Estonian 
Constitution‟s clause on the ethnic Estonian 
origin of the state and was from the outset 
geared towards protecting the culture of the 
dominant group, the ethnic Estonians. 
Especially, the earlier programmes left many to 
believe that the aim of the social integration 
programme was assimilation of Russian 
speakers.
34
 Although Russia had become a 
member of the Council of Europe in 1996 and 
ratified the FCNM in 1998, a year before law on 
the State Policy of the Russian Federation in 
respect of compatriots abroad, Estonia‟s 
accession to the EU was being negotiated during 
that period from 1997 to 2002. This may likely 
have had some influence on the motivations of 
the Russian law makers to adopt the law in 
1999.  
BULGARIA 
The Bulgarian law for Bulgarians living outside 
the Republic of Bulgaria was adopted by the 
National Assembly on 29 March 2000.
35
 It 
pertains to Bulgarians living outside the 
Republic of Bulgaria, who have at least one 
ascendant of Bulgarian origin, who have 
Bulgarian national consciousness, and who stay 
permanently or continuously on the territory of 
another country. The aim of the law is to support 
organisations of Bulgarians outside the Republic 
of Bulgaria whose activities are directed toward 
preservation and development of the Bulgarian 
linguistic, cultural and religious traditions. The 
law does not refer to appropriations but does 
provide for material support in the fields of 
education, language, culture and religion both 
within Bulgaria and in the country where the 
individuals of Bulgarian origin are resident. It 
also facilitates repatriation and return. In 
addition, the law provides for a National Council 
for Bulgarians living outside the Republic of 
Bulgaria which is a state public body with 
organisational, co-ordinating and representative 
functions that expresses and co-ordinates the 
national interests with the interests of the 
Bulgarians living outside Bulgaria. The National 
Council is funded via the state budget. The 
territorial reach of the Bulgarian law is 
somewhat unclear in that it does not explicitly 
mention Bulgarian organizations abroad as 
beneficiaries but rather refers to the needs of 
Bulgarians living abroad.  
 
Although Bulgaria had ratified the 
FCNM in 1999, a year before, the political 
motivation for the Bulgarian law should most 
likely be seen in the perspective of domestic 
politics. Based on provisions in its Constitution, 
Bulgaria has enacted quite liberal laws on 
citizenship for returnees, and in 1998 it adopted 
a law on dual citizenship for Bulgarians living 
outside the country. As a result, many 
Bulgarians outside of Bulgaria have become 
citizens and are able to vote in national and local 
elections, a matter which has become somewhat 
controversial since Bulgaria became a member 
of the EU in 2007 because in effect it means that 
non-EU citizens are voting for the European 
Parliament. It is estimated that since 2001, 
thousands of ethnic Bulgarians have applied and 
received citizenship, and the law on Bulgarians 
living outside Bulgaria is generally seen as a 
supporting law to the citizenship law. Some 
have argued that it has a strong religious aim in 
that the Bulgarian government‟s organisational 
efforts in this area can be understood as „an 
attempt to symbolically restore the Bulgarian 
Exarchate through some modern surrogate, 
which would institutionalise links with the 
ethnic Bulgarians abroad.‟36 Whether the aim is 
to increase the voting body or the scope of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the law seems to 
have mainly a domestic purpose.   
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HUNGARY 
The Hungarian law on Hungarians living in 
neighbouring countries adopted on 19 June 2001 
and amended in June 2003, is arguably the best 
known example of unilateral legislation 
favouring co-nationals outside the mother 
state.
37
 The beneficiaries of the Hungarian law, 
also known as the “Hungarian status-law,” are 
persons living outside Hungary who declare 
themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who 
are not Hungarian citizens and who have their 
residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic 
of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine. 
The aim of the law is to comply with Hungary‟s 
responsibilities for Hungarians living abroad and 
to promote the preservation and development of 
their manifold relations with Hungary prescribed 
in paragraph (3) of Article 6 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Hungary, and to ensure that 
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries 
form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole 
and to promote and preserve their well-being 
and awareness of national identity within their 
home country. The purpose of the law is to put 
Hungarian minorities in the targeted countries in 
the position to enjoy identical rights in the area 
of culture with Hungarian citizens. These rights 
are described in detail in the legislation. The law 
does not appropriate any amounts specifically 
but refers to a separate group of appropriations 
to be made annually by the state budget. The 
beneficiaries can on the basis of the 
establishment of their eligibility apply to a set of 
public benefit organizations regulated by the Act 
CLCI of 1997 on Public Benefit Organisations. 
The jurisdiction of the law is defined as the 
territory of the Republic of Hungary and the 
place of residence of the beneficiaries in the 
neighbouring countries.  
 
The extraterritorial reach of the law is 
quite clear and has been discussed intensively 
publicly as well as in the writings of experts.
38
 It 
does not appear that there were consultations 
with the governments of the targeted states 
during the drafting of the law. This eventually 
happened as a result of the public eye. It was 
reviewed and amended in 2003 due to the 
ongoing scrutiny that Hungary was subjected to 
at the time as a candidate country in accession 
talks with the European Commission.
39
 Much 
has been written and said about the Hungarian 
status-law, its controversial aims and its political 
motivation. The law was drafted during the first 
premiership of Viktor Orban, leader of the 
Hungarian Civic Union Party, Fidesz, in power 
from 1998 to 2002, and the amendments made in 
2003 came after a new government under Peter 
Medgyessy had come into office. Speculations 
range from the fact that Hungary was still 
experiencing the trauma of Trianon, the 1920 
treaty which legitimized the changes to the 
territory of Hungary after World War I, and thus 
a need for Hungary to make a symbolic reversal 
of that treaty, to more urgent issues, such as the 
fact that when Hungary would join the EU and 
eventually the Schengen agreement, many 
Hungarian co-nationals in Romania would be 
legally barred from easy access to Hungary.
40
 
The latter problem has, of course, since become 
irrelevant. The actual value to Hungarians living 
outside Hungary remains to be fully assessed. 
But the law was conceived, drafted, adopted and 
amended during a time when Hungary was a 
member of the Council of Europe and had 
signed and ratified the FCNM immediately after 
it was adopted in 1995. The political motivation 
remains, therefore, a puzzle to many, not least 
because it was not repealed when the more 
moderate government of Medgyessy came into 
power.     
ROMANIA 
Not surprisingly, the Romanian law concerning 
Romanians living abroad adopted by the 
Romanian Parliament in November 2007 came 
to be seen as a reaction to the Hungarian law.
41
 
The Romanian law replaced a previous law 
“Regarding the support granted to the 
Romanians communities from all over the 
world” of 15 July 1998. The 2007 law pertains 
to persons of Romanian ethnic origin, and those 
of persons sharing a common Romanian cultural 
identity, residing outside Romanian borders. It 
provisions undefined subsidies in the fields of 
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culture, including cultural heritage, education, 
language, and religion. The subsidies derive 
both from the annual state budget and private 
donations. The administration of the law is 
funded by the Romanian government budget. As 
to its jurisdiction, the law clearly has extra-
territorial reach. However, the law stipulates that 
it shall be applied without prejudice to the 
principles of territorial sovereignty, good 
neighbourliness, reciprocity, pacta sunt 
servanda, respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination, 
and it provisions that it will be implemented on 
the basis of the conclusion of agreements and 
programs with the states where the beneficiaries 
live or of protocols of the bilateral Joint 
Commissions and respectively on the basis of 
reciprocity as well as in line with the FCNM, the 
Venice Commission and the HCNM. The law 
thus remains within the internationally accepted 
approach to kin-state relations. Moreover, the 
law has global reach and thus might be seen as 
multilateral in that it complies with the 
international approach. Nevertheless, it was 
adopted five years after Romania had ratified the 
FCNM in 2002, thus leaving open the question 
as to the law‟s interpretation in European 
relations.  
DENMARK 
On 23 March 2010, the Danish Parliament 
adopted Bill No L98
42
 appropriating funds for 
the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein, 
Germany.
43
 The Bill titled, “Bill about the South 
Slesvig Committee and the subsidies for the 
Danish minority in South Slesvig
44
 that lie 
within the Minister for Education‟s 
jurisdiction”45 covers a major part of the 
subsidies that are appropriated each year to the 
Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein.
46
 A 
small number of subsidies for other Danish 
institutions in Schleswig-Holstein are not 
covered by the Bill.
47
 The legislation entered 
into force on 1 April 2010. Before the adoption 
of the Bill, subsidies for the Danish minority 
were appropriated through a footnote 
(tekstanmærkning) to the state budget
48
 and 
administered by the Committee Concerning 
Cultural Issues in South Slesvig.
49
 Heretofore, 
the Danish minority negotiated directly with the 
members of that Committee as to the allocation 
of the funds among the various organizations 
belonging to the minority. The new legislation 
will continue to be overseen by a committee, the 
South Slesvig Committee, and a secretariat has 
been established within the Ministry of 
Education to which the minority organizations 
must submit applications for subsidies and 
specific projects. This Secretariat furthermore 
provides government oversight in that the 
Minister for Education has to pre-review the 
allocations selected by the Committee.  
 
The aspect of oversight was a key 
element and likely the political motivation for 
the adoption of the Bill. The Danish authorities 
have allocated subsidies to the Danish minority 
since 1920. Since 1995, the annual subsidies 
became a budget item approved by the 
Parliament, albeit in the form of a footnote. The 
idea of elevating the footnote policies of the 
Danish Parliament to a legal process began 
surfacing in 2009 when the Danish Auditor 
General‟s Office on the basis of its annual audit 
of the Ministry of Education indicated that the 
amount allocated to South Slesvig was of such a 
size that it warranted a proper law rather than a 
footnote. The purpose of the funding was also 
criticized as being far too broad and lacking 
operationalization. Moreover, the scrutiny by the 
Auditor General‟s Office had revealed criticism 
of the processes by which the funds were 
allocated. No application process existed, and 
the funds were allocated according to practice. 
Thus, no serious assessment of allocations took 
place, and virtually no conditions were attached 
to the funding. And lastly, the Committee and 
the Ministry were criticized for not following up 
on the actual use of the funds. Often accounting 
documentation was missing, and if received, it 
was seldom reviewed by the Ministry. Thus, 
there was clearly a feeling of lack of 
transparency and democratic openness in 
connection with the appropriations for the 
Danish minority in South Slesvig.  
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The unanimous adoption by the Danish 
Parliament was hailed by many as a historic day 
for Denmark and especially for the Danish 
minority in South Slesvig. The day the Bill was 
adopted, the Chairman of the Committee called 
the event unique not only for Denmark but also 
for Europe.
50
 And he hoped that other countries 
in Europe would follow the good Danish 
example.
51
 Another member of the Parliament 
likewise underscored the Danish perspective that 
the Bill could stand as a good European example 
because it signified a positive story.
52
 The 
positivity of the Bill was further highlighted by 
yet another member of the Parliament who 
argued that it showed the international 
community that Denmark was able to find 
mutual solutions to minority issues that did not 
provoke Germany. In short, there was a general 
consensus that the Bill is good PR for Denmark 
as well as a broad expectation that the 
international community would greet the Bill 
with appreciation.
53
  
 
Other than compliance with the state 
subsidy requirements under EU Community 
Law, it is not clear whether any international 
obligations were taken into consideration during 
the drafting and eventual adoption of the Bill. 
According to the Ministry of Education, Danish 
norms for administration of subsidies played a 
vital role in the drafting of the legislation.
54
 The 
provider of the subsidies must disburse of the 
funds according to Danish norms, including 
formulate clear goals for the appropriations, 
ensure that the goals are met, make the goals 
operational, and define clear targets and 
conditions for the subsidies. The provider must 
further require timely and correct reporting by 
the beneficiaries, and when reporting is 
received, the provider must review the material 
and assess whether targets are met. In addition to 
ensure adherence to Danish public 
administration norms, the draft Bill was sent for 
comments to the Danish Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, the Ministry of Interior 
and Health, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
55
 It was felt that 
since the Bill had no precedence in Danish law-
making, it was necessary to solicit a broad range 
of comments.  
Furthermore, in order to ensure compliance with 
German legislation, the draft Bill was sent to the 
Danish Embassy in Berlin and the Consulate 
General in Flensburg. It is not clear how the Bill 
was assessed in these two entities. However, we 
know according to one source in the Federal 
government, that German officials were neither 
consulted nor informed about the Bill and its 
process.
56
 Moreover, at the time, there was not 
any press coverage in German newspapers about 
the legislation, nor has any been identified later. 
This may explain why the Bill has not raised any 
interest in European countries with similar kin-
state relations.  
 
The bilateral relationship between Denmark 
and Germany with regard to minorities is based 
on the so-called Bonn-Copenhagen 
Declarations,
57
 issued in 1955 by both 
governments. These took the place of a bilateral 
treaty. Both Denmark and Germany have signed 
and ratified the FCNM and the Language 
Charter. Nevertheless, any concerns with 
Denmark‟s and Germany‟s obligations under 
international law seem to have had little 
relevance during the drafting period. As the Bill 
went through the obligatory three readings in the 
Danish Parliament few objections were received. 
Only the authority which had set the entire 
process in motion, the General Auditor‟s Office 
noted that the Bill did not go far enough in 
reducing the role of the members of the 
Parliament in the Committee.
58
 Apparently, the 
technicalities of good governance of state 
subsidies for kin-minorities motivated the 
drafting and the adoption of the Bill.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Unilateral action in favour of kin-minorities is 
not new to Europe. Throughout modern 
European history concerns for kin-minorities 
have been part of the fabric of inter-state 
politics, and this has contributed to relegating 
minority issues to the security area of 
international relations. Prior to the establishment 
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of the United Nations and the emerging human 
rights regime, irredentism was a prevalent 
concern in Europe. It was precisely this factor 
which contributed to elevating minority issues to 
the international arena after World War I. 
However, with the emergence of the 
international human rights regime after World 
War II, and especially with the emergence of the 
European minority rights regime after 1989, a 
gradual move from seeing minorities as a 
security concern to seeing them as a justice 
concern has basically eliminated the unilateral 
rhetoric on irredentism. This transformation 
from a security discourse to a justice discourse is 
thus a major change in Europe‟s approach to 
minority issues and protection.
59
 And with this 
change, the need for unilateral kin-state action 
has come to be seen as a breach of international 
law.  
 
Why then do states continue to issue 
unilateral laws and regulations after the adoption 
of the FCNM in 1995? Unilateral action prior to 
1995 is perhaps understandable, especially in the 
years running up to the end of the Cold War and 
immediately after. But some of the strongest 
unilateral actions, such as the Russian policy on 
compatriots abroad and the Hungarian Status 
Law have come after 1995, respectively in 1999 
and 2001. This paper has tried to put these and 
other initiatives in a political and strategic 
perspective in order to begin the analysis from 
an international relations perspective. But more 
questions need to asked and answered. Does 
legal bilateralism not work? Does legal 
multilateralism not work? Is there a tension 
between bilateralism and multilateralism in 
minority protection? How does the phenomenon 
relate to the debate on legal pluralism? 
Moreover, are there political instruments and 
fora that could avert unilateral action before it 
becomes legal? The political motivations behind 
unilateral action are domestic as well as 
external. And often they have roots in historical 
experiences, especially in the case of national 
minorities. At least this has been indicated in the 
case of the Hungarian Status Law. A contextual 
perspective of legal unilateralism is required 
with regard to inter-state minority politics in 
Europe to begin answering these questions.  
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